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

IS THE WORLD A PROBLEM?

Ambiguities in the secular

Thomas Merton

THE NATO CRISIS

Zbigniew Brzezinski

FREUD SAW IT COMING

Daniel Callahan

ST CHARLES SEMINARY
12-66

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NEWS AND VIEWS

Out in California, the striking grape-pickers put on a Passion Play during Holy Week. At the moment when the crowd, rejecting Christ, cried: "We have no king but Caesar!", murmurs of assent rippled through the audience. It seems that a large number of the play-goers thought it was a reference to Cesar Chavez, leader of the grape strike.

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From the platform of the American Anti-Imperialist League, 1899:

"We insist that the subjugation of any people is 'criminal aggression' and open disloyalty to the distinctive principles of our government. We earnestly condemn the policy of the present National Administration in the Philippines. It seeks to extinguish the spirit of 1776 in those islands. We deplore the sacrifice of our soldiers and sailors, whose bravery deserves admiration even in an unjust war. We denounce the slaughter of Filipinos as a needless horror . . .

"We deny that the obligation of all citizens to support their government in times of grave national peril applies to the present situation. If an administration may with impunity ignore the issues upon which it was chosen, deliberately create a condition of war anywhere on the face of the globe, debauch the civil service for spoils to promote the adventure, organize a truth-suppressing censorship and demand of all citizens a suspension of judgment and their unanimous support while it chooses to continue the fighting, representative government itself is imperiled."

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"I repeat: 'May my country ever be right; but right or wrong—my country.' "—Cardinal Spellman, endorsing (again) a quote from Stephen Decatur and applying it to Vietnam (again).

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"What religion is traditionally supposed to do about wars is to enact a ritualistic role. It says, 'War is bad but this war is okay. You have done a wicked thing but you are forgiven.' Now, I don't want to make cheap fun of this absolving function but clearly its purpose is to be reassuring and to enact a role that is traditional. The authority of this position is distilled from the experience and needs of the community.

"Now, the other religious function—commonly called the prophetic—is to attack the community's position in the name of a superior moral insight. This is a role that we would all lay claim to, but . . . the role of a prophet is not an easy one and the role of an institutional prophet may be an impossible one. It is usually the institutions, and most notably the churches, against whom the prophets are being prophetic. The idea of our large, cumbersome organized religious groups being prophetic is rather like asking a computer to sing a love song." —Arthur Moore, in *Worldview*

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The *Catholic Directory* for 1966, just published, shows there are 605,556 more American Catholics than last year, and 878 fewer men studying for the priesthood. This is a decline of about 2 percent in the enrollment of scholasticates, novitiates and seminaries.

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The City Fathers of Dallas have backed down under criticism of the projected historical markers for the site of President Kennedy's assassination. As reported here two weeks ago, the plaques included interminable facts about the growth of Dallas and only got around to mentioning the assassination in the final sentences. The decision was not one to cut out the extraneous puffery about the city, but to postpone indefinitely the entire plan for plaques.

•

"The total absence of divorce in Italy —legal separation does not allow the partners to remarry—has led to the creation of so many de facto separations and cohabitations that, allowing an average of two children for each union, the number of people affected by this legal and ecclesiastical ban is estimated at around five million: one Italian in ten. . . . It is not much use telling Italians that they are backward and out of date and that to reject an institution which so many other nations have adopted merely demonstrates their provincialism. The only useful approach is to make people see the importance of the question in relation to the problems of their own society. This was done in an intelligent and effective way by Pietro Germi in his brilliant satirical film 'Divorce—Italian-style.' In this film a murder was committed in the certainty that the murderer could get off with a maximum sentence of five years on a plea of passionate motives.

"Such murders occur in Italy every week. But the greatest hardship arising out of the rigor of Italy's marriage laws concerns the children. Paternal authority belongs to the legal father, who is a woman's first (and only) husband, no matter how long they have been separated. A married woman, though separated and living with another man, may not give their child either its father's or her own maiden name. Recently a 'legal father' reclaimed a child born to his ex-wife and another man, and took it, with the consent of the courts, away from a loving home. The case moved public opinion more than all the theorectical argument about divorce.

"Sooner or later, Signor Germi believes, divorce will become available to Italians, not through the politicians, but through the church. He could be right, even though the first reaction of the Italian bishops has been hostile. . . .

"What in fact happened was that the council raised the issue of freedom of conscience and it is from this angle that progressive Catholics in Italy, including certain Jesuits, approach the question of divorce. Marriage, they say, is indissoluble for those who look upon it as a sacrament, but the others (even if custom induces them to get married in the Church) should be able to get a divorce."—from *The Economist*

JOHN LEO

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CORRESPONDENCE

Church Music

Latrobe, Pa.

To the Editors: Mr. Thibodeau's awesome fiasco in contemporary music for the American Church (April 8) comes as no surprise to anyone who has ever sung a morning Mass or directed a choir at a Sunday High Mass. (For those reared in the Vatican II age, the pre-Conciliar Church had a custom of offering a Mass in the pre-business hours for those who were so bent to pray at that hour. It also provided an opportunity for an organist to make a buck.) His charge that polyphonic music of the Roman Church is in danger of losing its 600-year-old life (I would say 1,000-year-old life—I like Medieval Organum) sounds a bit exagerrated, if not, panic-stricken. I would question his accusation that choirs who had been performing first-rate choral literature are disbanding and, thus, losing the great tradition of the Church's choral art music.

With any amount of ingenuity, the director of such a choir can use his virtuoso organization in fresh and new ways. I've yet to hear anyone saying that the choir could not perform Renaissance polyphony at various points in the vernacular liturgy; at least, no one who sets official policies. E.g., it's entirely possible to perform polyphonic masterworks at various points in the vernacular liturgy. Instead of singing a communion hymn, the choir could easily perform a motet. Occasionally, an item from the Latin Ordinary would be performed. Such repertoire can be used in the celebration of the Liturgy along with the "dreary, one-voiced Gebrauchmusik." One cannot help but wonder that if the choir director is worth his salt, why is he performing "dreary, one-voiced Gebrauchmusik"?

I'm well aware of the tons of dull pieces in the vernacular on the market today just as I'm well aware of the tons of Latin works that are equally dull. Careful perusal of the new materials, however, bring to fore some interesting new works. It takes some searching, but

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THE SEASON'S SPEECHES

This has been the season of speeches. Not the everyday, business-like speeches of public officials, announcing programs, spreading praise and proclaiming the populace's virtue. Not even the commencement speakers' platitudes (that season is just opening). No, these have been the real thing: lengthy examinations of America's efforts overseas, sweeping attempts at describing an approach to foreign policy, determined efforts to provide the framework for public debate and dissent. Senator Fulbright lectured the nation on "the arrogance of power" in three addresses at Johns Hopkins. Robert Kennedy reviewed the accomplishments, or lack of them, of the Alliance for Progress. Secretary McNamara went to Montreal to outline the challenges to American foreign policy for the American Society of Newspaper Editors. And President Johnson did his Dr. Reasonableness and Mr. Pride act, pleading with his critics to maintain a level of mature discussion in his address at Princeton, calling them "nervous Nellies" and impugning their patriotism the next week in Chicago.

Of the President's own first-class Nellie-bird performance, little enough needs to be said. If his efforts to negotiate with Hanoi at all resemble his efforts to negotiate with his critics, then one should not be surprised at their failure. The President's latest outburst, given its political setting, was quite obviously an effort to prevent Democratic candidates for Congress from escaping identification with the Administration's Vietnam policy—and thereby forcing them to defend and promote that policy at the grass roots. This is indeed a Presidential attempt to "lead the nation." But it will lead the nation —and the President—right into a hole. When the Vietnamese conflict ends in either a compromise or a loss (both of which, to the American mind, are often the same thing) everyone who has had doubts about the Vietnam enterprise will become an ally of the Administration. President Johnson is engaged in the foolhardy business of diminishing the number of his future allies.

The addresses by Fulbright, Kennedy and McNamara are of a different

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order of importance. They show the extent of America's uneasiness with its acts across the globe: first, Fulbright, the loner, the outsider; then Kennedy, the insider, with ambitions; and finally, with McNamara, the aura of uneasiness appears to have reached the inner circle itself.

Fulbright, Kennedy, and McNamara have all been criticized for ultimately saying nothing new. "When Fulbright quits fulminating against American arrogance and gets down to brass tacks about specific foreign-policy steps . . . it's awfully hard to see why his views should seem to upset President Johnson," writes one commentator in the *New Republic*. Kennedy, of course, is specific—it is the Kennedy style. But he wavers on the edge of condemning the Dominican Republic intervention—and does not. He points to problems ahead in Brazil and tells us—to be careful. As for McNamara, not only does he refer favorably, at least in passing, to almost every recent foreign policy decision of the U.S., but clerks at the White House Curia rush to assure everyone the next day that the Angelic Doctor had said it all before.

But this sort of criticism misses the point. Underlying it is the notion which hamstrings so many critics of American foreign policy—and which must finally lead to disillusionment—that there is some sort of New Thing which could suddenly reverse the unfortunate direction of America's over-all impact abroad. For some, it is the complete abandonment of "power politics." For others, it is unilateral disarmament. For still others, it is unstinting support for "revolutions." It is as though the U.S., at some critical juncture in its past, took a sharp wrong turn; now all that must be done is to turn back.

What is forgotten is that many, if not most, of the U.S.'s present dilemmas have their roots in well-intentioned and even necessary decisions. The atom bomb was not developed out of fear of Cuba, but out of fear of Nazi Germany; and it was Albert Einstein, not Curtis LeMay, who urged Roosevelt to develop it. The Cold War began not with American resistance to Russia but with British firmness and American withdrawal; and it was George Kennan and not Barry Goldwater who formulated the policy of containment.

Something has gone wrong. There is no doubt about that. But it was little by little. Contingent policies hardened into eternal verities. Where once the U.S. favored opposing Communism *and* enlarging freedom *and* building economies, we now seem to favor opposing Communism, *then* building economies, *then* enlarging freedom. For all the criticism which can easily be directed at the talks by Fulbright, Kennedy and McNamara, it is their merit that they stress the multiple tasks which the U.S. cannot avoid (except at its peril) in this world—and suggest that the relative priorities of these tasks must be given constant review.

When McNamara reminds us that national security is more than military hardware, when Senator Kennedy suggests that his aid proposal for all of Latin America would be "the cost of approximately four weeks of the struggle in Vietnam," they are not suggesting a panacea or an escape from international obligations. They are saying that time has badly shuffled our priorities, and that we had best get them in order once again.

THE WISDOM OF PESSIMISM

There is one certain way of always being right about the Vietnamese war: imagine the worst and make predictions accordingly. This is of course not the approved American way; the power of positive thinking is supposed to cover all contingencies. The trouble with positive thinking about the Vietnamese war, however, is that it just doesn't work. Witness the foolish optimism which set in after the overthrow of Premier Diem. Witness Secretary McNamara's prediction in 1963 that the U.S. might be out of South Vietnam in 1965. Witness the optimism of air power proponents and of military men when the U.S. increased the pace of bombings and radically increased the number of soldiers and marines. Witness the buoyancy which Washington exhibited when Premier Ky came to power. So much, then, for positive thinking.

Since pessimism works better, let us see where it leads us. Consider, first, the political and military requirements for peace in Vietnam. On the political side, peace would require: (a) a stable, representative South Vietnamese government willing and able to negotiate with the NLF and Hanoi; (b) an NLF-Hanoi decision to seek negotiations; (c) an American willingness to settle for a negotiated peace, even if this meant something less than a clear-cut victory. On the military side—assuming that a political settlement is not possible—victory would require: (a) a strong, unified South Vietnamese army capable of aggressively pursuing the Vietcong; (b) a much larger American military force, able and willing to spend years if necessary in South Vietnam.

Consider, secondly, the internal requirements for a stable South Vietnam, equally necessary for military victory or political settlement: (a) the carrying out of the elections agreed upon in the truce between Premier Ky and the United Buddhist Church over a month ago; (b) the election of a respected and representative government; (c) an American determination to support the elections and their results, whatever the military cost.

Is it likely at this point that *any* of these requirements could be met? There is no special reason to think so. The prospects of a stable South Vietnam grow dimmer with every passing day. While it is true that Premier Ky has restored a kind of order by defeating the rebels in Danang he has probably insured in the process the unappeasable enmity of the Buddhists. Should he try by force to subdue the rebels in Hué he will just add to that enmity. Perforce, then, his military junta is now faced with powerful opposition which will work unceasingly to bring its downfall.

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Since the same kind of opposition brought down Diem, it has a good chance of doing the same with Ky.

This same enmity almost insures the impossibility of the planned elections taking place. Even if, by some miracle, they should be held, the chances of the defeated parties, accepting the results appear just about nil. Add here the American disinterest in elections—with all the uncertainties an entirely fresh regime would bring—and the very idea appears little more than an LSD vision.

If internal stability now seems out of the question, isn't it still possible that American military might could turn the trick against the Vietcong? Well hardly, for this strength depends in part upon South Vietnamese military support (it used to be the other way around; remember those days?), and that is likely to be less and less forthcoming as the military junta is increasingly forced to fight for its life. Naturally, the United States could just try and do without this support, but that would require a massive increase in the American military commitment. Such an increase is hardly likely to be forthcoming if all the evidence seems to show that South Vietnam is too divided, too weary,. too confused to do its part against the Vietcong. And can anyone say it shows anything else now?

The American people are already showing signs of skepticism; it will not require much more confusion to turn their stomachs altogether. That would be an eminently healthy expression of the power of pessimistic thinking.

ALTERNATE SERVICE

Defense Secretary McNamara's proposal that the U.S. might permit some form of alternate service for young Americans of draft age is perhaps the most venturesome idea that has been heard from an Administration official since the early days of the war on poverty. The day after the Montreal speech in which McNamara made his suggestion, a White House spokesman denied that the Secretary of Defense meant what he said, and that in any case it was nothing that President Johnson had not already said. And, in any event, nothing would be done about it while the war continues in Vietnam. Well, so much for venturesomeness.

But it was a good idea nonetheless, one which, as the spokesman said, is implicit in many of President Johnson's statements about the great society and the underdeveloped nations. It can be only for acute political reasons that the White House felt compelled to dunk the idea so unceremoniously. For practically speaking, there are many good reasons why service in the Peace Corps, or in certain domestic service programs, might be made alternatives to military duty. Among these, as Secretary McNamara explained in his speech, is the fact that U.S. security and the world's hope for peace cannot be maintained simply by military means. Almost all the wars and outbreaks of violence in the past decade have been directly tied to economic problems in the poor nations. Peace of any lasting sort in these nations can be achieved only through development, and on this score the U.S. has ample opportunity to make good use of its youth in other ways than military.

It also happens that present draft procedures discriminate in that some, usually from the lower economic rungs of our society, are called to military service while others escape service of any kind. To remedy this situation by drafting everybody for military service merely compounds the waste in talent and resources. Yet, if fairness is an issue, then all should be called to some kind of service. And, if respect for individual integrity is to be maintained, that service should be a useful one.

There are other objections to the proposal, however, that do not easily yield satisfactory solutions. For one thing, what effect would compulsory service have on programs such as the Peace Corps, whose value ultimately lies in its idealism and voluntary nature? We can imagine many might be tempted to choose that service as the lesser of two evils. But perhaps tours of duty could be designed to mitigate against this factor. Military service might be reduced to 18 months while alternate forms of service could be increased to three years. In any case, service in the Peace Corps, if preferable to being shot at, is hardly less arduous than that of routine military duty in peacetime. In fact, we suspect it is a good deal rougher. Beyond this are the intellectual and technical skill needs that would go far toward screening out undesirable candidates.

A second objection, returning to the question of fairness, is perhaps even more difficult to resolve. For military service is really in a class by itself. Nothing can substitute for risking one's life in war, or for performing the tasks of war which we have come to recognize are truly horrible. Again, it will be those from the lower economic layers of society who will bear the brunt of this apparently inescapable service.

On top of this are doubts about the propriety of the state's requiring service that is not directly tied to the nation's security. It can be argued, as Secretary McNamara has, that such programs as the Peace Corps and the war on poverty are indeed integral to our security. It can also be argued that the power of the state over our lives is increasing and will continue to do so for some time to come as society becomes more complex and its functions more inter-related. If a reversal does come, it will only be after the problems that led to a strong centralized state have been eliminated. Furthermore, the possibility of alternate service provides an opportunity to drastically alter the historic function of the state, which has been to prepare for and to make war, in the direction of humanitarian goals that may ultimately free men to make their own lives. If the only result of alternate service is to destroy the idea that the greatest patriotic act is to kill in defense of one's country, it will have been worthwhile.

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ALL THINGS CONSIDERED

KENNEDY ON LATIN AMERICA

"A revolution is coming whether we will it or not . . . the question now is how the revolution is to be made and guided." The words are those of Senator Robert F. Kennedy, taken from his recent remarks on Latin America; the speech constitutes one more step by him toward mapping out a consistent worldview vis-à-vis the Johnson Administration.

There were those who were disappointed with the Kennedy speech, delivered on two successive days in the Senate. In one sense he said nothing new, and he had no really revolutionary proposals to make. Nonetheless, his comments added up to a balanced and realistic view of the situation in Latin America.

It is imperative, Senator Kennedy said, that the U.S. pay greater attention to the revolutionary currents at work in Latin America and that we identify with the leaders of these groups, rather than with the representatives of the dead past. Significantly, he called for understanding, even when cooperation is impossible, of the radical, anti-American Marxism of students who "seem to have sensed that their societies, as presently constituted, have not enough room for achievements; that they have inadequate opportunity to establish themselves on the great stage of public affairs, to dare and achieve for their countries and for their posterity."

Although this address by Senator Kennedy could not be considered a flat repudiation of Administration policies, it asked for such a changed spirit that President Johnson can hardly be expected to cheer for it. Supporting our commitment to the Alliance for Progress, for example, Senator Kennedy said: "The Charter [establishing the Alliance] is no precious talisman, to be taken from its case and exhibited periodically; it must be used. Its ideals must pervade every aspect of our policy. It must govern not only the necessarily infrequent acts of Presidents—but the daily acts of every member and part of the United States government with responsibility in Latin America."

Senator Kennedy stressed the political difficulties associated with social change. In urging land reform, for example, he said that the problems raised by it "will be as difficult to resolve as basic issues within our own country, now and in the past—states' rights, slavery, tariffs, economic reform." Such problems will require new structures to deal with them, new institutions, because all, in Senator Kennedy's eyes, raise the fundamental question, "Who governs?"

On this point Administration experts stress economic reform and development and play down the political, even to the point of suggesting that it makes little difference whether a country is ruled by a constitutional regime or by a military junta. Senator Kennedy disagrees. "Thus there is no such thing as 'pure' economic development in Latin America. A better life for the people of Latin America can only come out of progress toward a better, more democratic political and social structure."

Senator Kennedy did not argue that the United States should withhold all aid from nations with military governments. What he urged was more sense of discrimination. In Brazil right now, for instance, where the situation has degenerated into a right-wing military dictatorship, he thinks we should show much more interest in the early return of civilian rule and much more concern with the increasingly arbitrary acts of its military masters.

On the political front, Senator Kennedy urged that the United States be more discerning in its efforts to organize resistance to Communist subversion. "If we allow ourselves to become allied with those to whom the cry of 'Communism' is only an excuse for the perpetuation of privilege, if we assist, with military materials and other aid, governments which use that aid to prevent reform for the people, then we will give the Communists a strength which they cannot attain by anything they themselves might do." Illustrating that danger, Senator Kennedy warned against stressing anti-Communist action from any position milder than that of a radically reforming democracy. "There is a village in the Andes where only one person has ever come to say that he believed in land for the peasants. That one man was a Communist; and now many of these villagers call themselves Communists too, since they are in favor of land reform."

The U.S. program of military assistance for anti-insurgency could be fatal unless the regime involved offers hope to the impoverished peasantry. "Counter-insurgency might best be described as social reform under pressure. Any effort which disregards the base of social reform and becomes preoccupied with gadgets and techniques and force is doomed to failure."

In one sense, of course, the critics are right: there is nothing really new about Senator Kennedy's speech. Everyone who knows anything at all about the problems in the area knows we should provide a massive increase in economic assistance to Latin America; everyone knows we have been too cozy with military dictatorships; everyone knows that we are inclined to see the threat of Communism in all social unrest. But if they are things "everyone knows," they are also things which no one does much about, and now they have been enunciated by a man who may one day be President of the United States. That is why Senator Kennedy's Latin American speech was important.

JAMES O'GARA

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IS THE WORLD A PROBLEM?

Ambiguities in the secular

THOMAS MERTON

Is the world a problem? I type the question. I am tempted to type it over again, with asterisks between the letters, the way H*y*m*a*n K*a*p*l*a*n used to type his name in the *New Yorker* twenty years ago. And as far as I am concerned that would dispose of the question. But COMMONWEAL is doubtless too concerned about the question to accept this: a blank page with "Is the world a problem" running down the middle, full of asterisks. So I have to be serious too, and develop it. It is, you see, a *topic*. And a topical topic.

Maybe I can spell this topic out coherently, admitting that there are still cogent reasons why the question should be asked and answered. Perhaps, too, I am personally involved in the absurdity of the question. Due to a book I wrote thirty years ago, I have myself become a sort of stereotype of the world-denying contemplative—the man who spurned New York, spat on Chicago, and tromped on Louisville, heading for the woods with Thoreau in one pocket, John of the Cross in another, and holding the Bible open at the Apocalypse. This stereotype is probably my own fault, and it is something I have to try to demolish on occasion. This is one of the occasions.

Now that we are all concerned about the Church and the World, the Secular City, and the values of secular society, it was to be expected that someone would turn quizzically to me and ask: "What about you, Father Merton? What do *you* think?"—and then duck as if I were St. Jerome with a rock in my fist.

First of all, the whole question of *the world*, the *secular world*, has become extremely ambiguous. It becomes ever more ambiguous when it is set up over against another entity, the world of the sacred. The old duality of time-eternity, matter-spirit, natural-supernatural and so on (which makes sense in a very limited and definite context) is suddenly transposed into a totally different context in which it creates nothing but confusion. This confusion is certainly a problem. Whether or not "the world" is a problem, *a confused idea of what the world might possibly be* is quite definitely a problem. So what I want to talk about is this confusion, and what I myself think about it at the moment.

I want to make clear that I speak not as the author of the *Seven Storey Mountain*, which seemingly a lot of people have read, but as the author of more recent essays and poems which apparently very few people have read. This is not the official voice of Trappist silence, the monk with his hood up and his back to the camera, brooding over the waters of an artificial lake. This is not the petulant and uncanonizable modern Jerome who never got over the fact that he could give up beer. (I drink beer whenever I can lay hands on any. I love beer, and, by that very fact, the world.) This is simply the voice of a self-questioning human person who, like all his brothers, struggles to cope with turbulent, mysterious, demanding, exciting, frustrating, confused existence in which almost nothing is really predictable, in which most definitions, explanations and justifications become incredible even before they are uttered, in which people suffer together and are sometimes utterly beautiful, at other times impossibly pathetic. In which there is much that is frightening, in which almost everything public is patently phoney, and in which there is at the same time an immense ground of personal authenticity that is *right there* and so obvious that no one can talk about it and most cannot even believe that it is there.

THOMAS MERTON *(Father Louis, O.C.S.O.) is the author of several books, most recently,* Seasons of Celebration *(Farrar, Straus).*

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I am, in other words, a man in the modern world. In fact, I *am* the world just as you are! Where am I going to look for the world first of all if not in myself?

Escape?

As long as I assume that the world is something I discover by turning on the radio or looking out the window I am deceived from the start. As long as I imagine that the world is something to be "escaped" in a monastery—that wearing a special costume and following a quaint observance takes me "out of this world," I am dedicating my life to an illusion. Of course, I hasten to qualify this. I said a moment ago that in a certain historic context of thought and of life, this kind of thought and action once made perfect sense. But the moment you change the context, then the whole thing has to be completely transposed. Otherwise you are left like the orchestra in the Marx Brothers' "Night at the Opera" where Harpo had inserted "Take me out to the Ball Game" in the middle of the operatic score.

The confusion lies in this; on one hand there is a primitive Christian conception of *the world as an object of choice*. On the other there is the obvious fact that the world is also something about which there is and can be no choice. And, historically, these notions have sometimes got mixed up, so that what is simply "given" appears to have been chosen, and what is there to be chosen, decided for or against, is simply evaded as if no decision were licit or even possible.

That I should have been born in 1915, that I should be the contemporary of Auschwitz, Hiroshima, Vietnam and the Watts riots, are things about which I was not first consulted. Yet they are also events in which, whether I like it or not, I am deeply and personally involved. The "world" is not just a physical space traversed by jet planes and full of people running in all directions. It is a complex of responsibilities and options made out of the loves, the hates, the fears, the joys, the hopes, the greed, the cruelty, the kindness, the faith, the trust, the suspicion of all. In the last analysis, if there is a stupid war in Vietnam because nobody trusts anybody, this is in part because I myself am defensive, suspicious, untrusting, and intent on making other people conform themselves to my particular brand of deathwish.

Put in these terms, the world both is and is not a problem. The world is a "problem" in so far as everybody in it is a problem to himself. The world is a problem in so far as *we* all add up to a big collective question. Starting then from this concept of a world which is essentially problematic because it is full of problematic and self-doubting freedoms, there have been various suggestions made as to what to do about it.

At present the Church is outgrowing what one might call the Carolingian suggestion. This is a worldview which was rooted in the official acceptance of the Church into the world of imperial Rome, the world of Constantine and of Augustine, of Charlemagne in the west and of Byzantium in the east. In crude, simple strokes, this worldview can be sketched as follows: We are living in the last age of salvation history. A world radically evil and doomed to hell has been ransomed from the devil by the Cross of Christ and is now simply marking time until the message of salvation can be preached to everyone. Then will come the judgment. Meanwhile, men being evil and prone to sin at every moment, must be prevented by authority from following their base instincts and getting lost.

They cannot be left to their own freedom or even to God's loving grace. They have to have their freedom taken away from them because it is their greatest peril. They have to be told at every step what to do, and it is better if what they are told to do is displeasing to their corrupt natures, for this will keep them out of further subtle forms of mischief. Meanwhile the Empire has become, provisionally at least, holy. As figure of the eschatological kingdom, worldly power consecrated to Christ becomes Christ's reign on earth. In spite of its human limitations the authority of the Christian prince is a guarantee against complete chaos and disorder and must be submitted to—to resist established authority is equivalent to resisting Christ. War on behalf of the Christian prince and his power becomes a holy war for Christ against the devil. War becomes a sacred duty.

The dark strokes in the picture have their historical explanation in the crisis of the Barbarian invasions. But there are also brighter strokes, and we find in the thought of Aquinas, Scotus, Bonaventure, Dante, a basically world-affirming and optimistic view of man, of his world and his work, in the perspective of the Christian redemption. The created world itself is an epiphany of divine wisdom and love, and, redeemed in and by Christ, will return to God with all its beauty restored by the transforming power of grace, which reaches down to material creation through man and his work. However, this view too is static rather than dynamic, hierarchic, layer upon layer, rather than on-going and self-creating, the fulfillment of a predetermined intellectual plan rather than the creative project of a free and self-building love.

The Task of Renewal

One of the essential tasks of *aggiornamento* is that of renewing the whole perspective of theology in such a way that our ideas of God, man and the world are no longer dominated by the Carolingian-medieval imagery of the sacred and hierarchical cosmos, in which everything is decided beforehand and in which the only choice is to accept gladly what is imposed as part of an immobile and established social structure.

In "turning to the world" the contemporary Church is, first of all, admitting that *the world can once again be-*

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come an object of choice. Not only can it be chosen, but in fact it must be chosen. How? If I had no choice about the age in which I was to live, I nevertheless have a choice about the attitude I take and about the way and the extent of my participation in its living on-going events. To *choose* the world is not then merely a pious admission that the world is acceptable because it comes from the hand of God. It is first of all an acceptance of a task and a vocation in the world, in history and in time. To choose the world is to choose to do the work I am capable of doing, in collaboration with my brother, to make the world better, more free, more just, more livable, more human. And it has now become transparently obvious that mere automatic "rejection of the world" and "contempt for the world" is in fact not a choice but the evasion of choice.

On the other hand the stereotype of world-rejection is now being firmly replaced by a collection of equally empty stereotypes of world affirmation in which I, for one, have very little confidence. They often seem to be gestures, charades, mummery designed to make those participating in them feel secure, to make them feel precisely that they are "like participating" and really doing something. So precisely at the moment when it becomes vitally important for the destiny of man that man should learn to *choose for himself* a peaceful, equitable, sane and humane world the whole question of choice itself becomes a stark and dreadful one. We talk about choosing, yet everything seems more grimly determined than ever before. We are caught in an enormous web of consequences, a net of erroneous and even pathological effects of other



men's decisions. After Hitler, how can Germany be anything but a danger to world peace? To choose the world therefore is to choose the anguish of being hampered and frustrated in a situation fraught with frightful difficulties. We can joyously affirm the world and its secular values all we like, but the complexity of events responds too often with a cold negation of our hopes.

In the old days when everyone compulsively rejected the world it was really not hard at all to secretly make quite a few healthy and positive affirmations of a worldly existence in the best sense of the word, in praise of God and for the good of all men. Nowadays when we talk so much of freedom, commitment, "engagement" and so on, it becomes imperative to ask whether the choices we are making have any meaning whatever. Do they change anything? Do they get us anywhere? Do we really choose to alter the direction of our lives or do we simply comfort ourselves with the choice of making another choice? Can we really decide effectively for a better world?

The Marxist View

The "suggestion" that has now most obviously replaced that of the Carolingians is that of Karl Marx. In this view, history is not finished, it has just reached the point where it may, if we are smart, begin. There is no predetermined divine plan (although frankly the messianism in Marx is basically Biblical and eschatological). After a long precarious evolution matter has reached the point, in man, where it can become fully aware of itself, take itself in hand, control its own destiny. And now at last that great seething mass of material forces, the world, will enter upon its true destiny by being raised to a human level. The instruments by which this can be accomplished—technology, cybernetics—are now in our power. But are we in our own power? No, we are still determined by the illusions of thought patterns, superstructures, devised to justify antiquated and destructive economic patterns. Hence if man is to *choose* to make himself, if he is to become free at last, his duty can be narrowed down to one simple option, one basic commitment: The struggle against the (imperialist) world.

With a shock we find ourselves in a familiar pattern: a predetermined struggle against evil in which personal freedom is viewed with intolerance and suspicion. The world must be changed because it is unacceptable as it is. But the change must be guided by authority and political power. The forces of good are all incarnate in this authority. The forces of evil are on the contrary incarnate in the power of the enemy system. Man cannot be left to himself. He must submit entirely to the control of the collectivity for which he exists. "Man" is not the person but the collective animal. Though he may eventually become free, now is not the time of freedom but of obedience, authority, power, control. Man does not choose to make himself except in the sense that he submits to a choice dictated by the authority of science and the messianic collective—the party which represents the chosen eschatological class. Though there are in theory all kinds of possible choices, in reality the only basic choice is that of rejecting and destroying the evil "world"—namely capitalist imperialism and, in the present juncture, the United States. Hence the ambiguities of Communist dogma at the moment: the choice of peace is of course nothing else than the choice of war against the United States. In other words, we have turned the page of "Aida" and we are now playing "Take me out to the Ball game," but it is the same crazy Marx Brothers' Opera. Freedom, hu-

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manism, peace, plenty and joy are all enthusiastically invoked, but prove on closer examination to be their opposites. There is only one choice, to submit to the decision handed down from on high by an authoritarian power which defines good and evil in political terms.

This, as I see it, is the present state of the question. The Church has finally realized officially that the classic worldview, which began to develop serious flaws five hundred years ago is no longer viable at all. There is something of a stampede for security in a new worldview.

In this endeavor the dialogue with Marxism is going to be of crucial importance not only for Christians but for Marxists. For if it is a true dialogue it will possibly involve some softening and adjustment of doctrinaire positions and an opening to new perspectives and possibilities of collaboration. Obviously, however, the dialogue with official and established Marxism—the Soviets or Red China—is not to be considered yet as a meaningful possibility. But the conversations that have begun with the type of revisionist Marxism represented by the French thinker Roger Garaudy may certainly have some effects. But what effects? Good or bad? It is all too easy for enthusiastic Catholics, having tasted a little of the new wine, to convince themselves that "turning to the world" and "choosing the world" means simply turning to Marx and choosing some variation, Maoist, Soviet, Castroist, of the Communist political line. There is no question that since the Council a few Catholic thinkers and publicists in Europe and South America are tending in this direction. Their tendency is understandable, but I do not find it altogether hopeful.

The majority of Catholic thinkers today are however working in the direction of a modern worldview in which the demands of the new humanism of Marx, Freud, Teilhard, Bonhoeffer and others are fully respected and often heartily endorsed. For them, the tendency is no longer to regard God as enthroned "out there" at the summit of the cosmos, but as the "absolute future" who will manifest himself in and through man, by the transformation of man and the world by science oriented to Christ. Though this certainly is not a view which conservative theologians find comforting, it represents a serious attempt to re-express Christian truths in terms more familiar to modern man. It demands that we take a more dynamic view of man and of society. It requires openness, freedom, the willingness to face risks. It also postulates respect for the human person in the human community. But at the same time it seems to me that it may have serious deficiencies in so far as it may ignore the really deep problems of collective technological and cybernetic society.

To assume, for instance, that just because scientific and technological humanism can theoretically be seen as "perfectly biblical" ("nothing is more biblical than technology," says Père Daniélou) does not alter the profound dehumanization that can in fact take place in technological society (as Daniélou also clearly sees). The fact that man can now theoretically control and direct his own destiny does nothing to mitigate the awful determinism which in practice makes a mockery of the most "realistic" plans and turns all man's projects diametrically against their professed humanistic aims. The demonic gap between expressed aims and concrete achievements in the conduct of the Vietnam war should be an object lesson in the impotence of technology to come to grips with the human needs and realities of our time.

The Danger

When "the world" is hypostatized (and it inevitably is) it becomes another of those dangerous and destructive fictions with which we are trying vainly to grapple. And for anyone who has seriously entered into the medieval Christian, or the Hindu, or the Buddhist conceptions of *"contemptus mundi," "Mara"* and the *"emptiness of the world,"* it will be evident that this means not the rejection of a reality, but the unmasking of an illusion.

The world as pure object is something that is not there. It is not a reality outside us for which we exist. It is not a firm and absolute objective structure which has to be accepted on its own inexorable terms. The world has in fact no terms of its own. It dictates no terms to man. We and our world interpenetrate. If anything, the world exists for us, and we exist for ourselves. It is only in assuming full responsibility for our world, for our lives and for ourselves that we can be said to live really for God. The whole human reality which of course transcends us as individuals and as a collectivity, nevertheless interpenetrates the world of nature (which is obviously "real") and the world of history (also "real" in so far as it is made up of the total effect of all our decisions and actions). But this reality though "external" and "objective" is not something entirely independent of us, which dominates us inexorably from without through the medium of certain fixed laws which science alone can discover and use. It is an extension and a projection of ourselves and of our lives, and if we attend to it respectfully, while attending also to our own freedom and our own integrity, we can learn to obey its ways and coordinate our lives with its mysterious movements.

The way to find the real "world" is not merely to measure and observe what is outside us, but to discover our own inner ground. For that is where the world is, first of all: in my deepest self. But there I find the world to be quite different from the "obligatory answers." This "ground," this "world" where I am mysteriously present at once to my own self and to the freedoms of all other men, is not a visible objective and determined structure with fixed laws and demands. *It is a living and self-creating mystery of which I am myself a part, to which I am myself my own unique door.*

When I find the world in my own ground, it is impossible for me to be alienated by it. It is precisely the

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obligatory answers which insist on showing me the world as totally other than myself and my brother, which alienate me from myself and from my brother. Hence I see no reason for our compulsion to manufacture ever newer and more shiny sets of obligatory answers.

The questions and the answers surely have their purpose. We are rational and dialectical beings. But even the best answers are themselves not final. They point to something further which cannot be embodied in a verbal formula. They point to life itself in its inalienable and personal ground. They point to that realm of values which, in the eyes of scientific and positivistic thought, has no meaning. But how can we come to grips with the world except in so far as it is a *value*? That is to say in so far as it *exists for us*?

There remains a profound wisdom in the traditional Christian approach to the world as to an object of choice. But we have to admit that the habitual and mechanical compulsions of a certain limited type of Christian thought have falsified the true value-perspective in which the world can be discovered and chosen as it is. To treat the world merely as an agglomeration of material goods and objects outside ourselves, and to reject these goods and objects in order to seek others which are "interior" and "spiritual" is in fact to miss the whole point of the challenging confrontation of the world and Christ.

Do we really choose between the world and Christ as between two conflicting realities absolutely opposed? Or do we choose Christ *by choosing the world as it really is in Him, that is to say created and redeemed by Him, and encountered in the ground of our own personal freedom and of our love?* Do we really renounce ourselves and the world in order to find Christ, or do we renounce our alienated and false selves in order to choose our own deepest truth in choosing both the world and Christ at the same time? If the deepest ground of my being is love, then in that very love itself and nowhere else will I find myself, *and* the world, *and* my brother *and* Christ. It is not a question of either/or but of all-in-one. It is not a matter of exclusivism and "purity" but of wholeness, wholeheartedness, unity and Meister Eckhart's *Gleichheit* (equality) which finds the same ground of love in everything.

The world cannot be a problem to anyone who sees that ultimately Christ, the world, his brother and his own inmost ground are made one and the same in grace and redemptive love. If all the current talk about the world helps people to discover this, then it is fine. But if it produces nothing but a whole new divisive gamut of obligatory positions and "contemporary answers" we might as well forget it. The world itself is no problem, but we are a problem to ourselves because we are alienated from ourselves, and this alienation is due precisely to an inveterate habit of division by which we break reality into pieces and then wonder why, after we have manipulated the pieces until they fall apart, we find ourselves out of touch with life, with reality, with the world and most of all with ourselves.

Beyond the Atlantic community

THE NATO CRISIS

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

Few would deny that the revival of European nationalism faces America with a mounting danger of becoming irrelevant to Europe's future. There is less agreement on what America can do about this.

Several factors are bringing this danger into being. The French President is systematically pursuing a three-stage policy:

A. To achieve the restoration of French prestige and France's role as a major factor in European politics. This, by and large, he has reason to feel he has already attained;

B. To dismantle the alliance-systems that grew out of the post-World War II division of Europe and the cold war. De Gaulle is currently engaged in the pursuit of this second objective;

C. To establish the new European equilibrium based on France and Russia, involving the eventual exclusion of the United States from the European concert. He probably would prefer not to tackle this objective until he has fully attained the second. However, there is reason to believe that because of his advanced age and the possibility of a rebuff in the next French parliamentary elections he has advanced his schedule. Thus a major Gaullist initiative, even if only of a symbolic nature, is to be expected at the June Moscow meeting. De Gaulle may even reason that proceeding with the third objective will promote a more speedy achievement of his second objective, the dismantling of the alliances.

Secondly, the American position on Europe may be

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eroded by the revival of German nationalism. In the short run, Gaullist initiatives are likely to strengthen the American-German relationship by reinforcing the German feeling of dependence on American support. In the longer run, however, they are likely to reinforce the case made by those Germans who already have argued that only an independent German approach to Moscow, somewhat on the French model, will promote German reunification. The younger generation of German political leaders is visibly more concerned with the problem of Germany's reunification, and it is increasingly dissatisfied with the largely declaratory American policy with regard to the problem of German unity.

Thirdly, it would be a mistake to assume that the revival of East European nationalism is automatically an advantage to the West. In the short run, the revival of East European nationalism may be construed as in keeping with American national interest and as harmful to the Soviet Union. However, in the long run it is likely to contribute to the balkanization of Europe and to the revival of narrow national conflicts and European instability. Accordingly, "building bridges" alone is no longer a satisfactory response to the novel setting of the sixties. It was a desirable policy for the late fifties since bilateral relations with individual East European states automatically reduced Soviet control over these states. Today, the Soviet Union is more inclined to accept pluralism in East Europe while bilateral American relations with the East European states simply contribute to the creation of a "Europe of states" on the Gaullist model.

Finally, the Soviet leadership is likely to be tempted to exploit de Gaulle's initiative for the purpose of further fragmenting the West. This temptation, and any success resulting from Soviet efforts are likely to reinforce the narrow ideological perspectives which have guided the Soviet approach to West European integration. This will rebound negatively on the American-Soviet relationship, undermining the detente and reawakening Soviet expansionist ambitions. As a result, it is likely to contribute to the further intensification of the cold war.

The most creative period in the American-European relationship was that of the forties and fifties. At that time, the United States had both power and influence in Europe, and it applied them to constructive ends. American power protected Europe while the appealing concept of European unity and close collaboration with America gave the United States unprecedented influence on the thinking of major sectors of European public opinion. Our concepts fitted the times and our power satisfied the felt needs.

Today, even though most Europeans recognize that they are still dependent on our power, many question the real immediacy of the Soviet threat. More importantly, many Europeans feel that in our concepts we have not taken adequate stock of the changes that have taken place in Europe, particularly in the East. Moreover, our aid to Europe facilitated European economic recovery *before* the attainment of economic integration. Both considerations have brought about a situation in which our power in Europe is no longer matched by our influence.

In contrast, de Gaulle, who has little power, does have a great deal of influence. To many Europeans, he seems to be addressing himself to the basic problem of Europe's future, that is to say, to the question of the postwar partition of Europe. In the absence of an articulate American conception, de Gaulle has been able to attract the sympathies of many among the neutralist circles in Great Britain and Scandinavia, among some Italians and very many East Europeans. Moreover, the younger generation in West Europe, which has grown up in a setting of relative well-being and security, does not have the same feeling for European-American interdependence that their fathers had. Thus, while de Gaulle's image of a future Europe may in fact not be realistic and is already contributing to a revival of narrow European nationalisms, it would be unwise to underestimate the degree of real support he commands in Europe.

The U.S. Response

United States policy so far has been responding to de Gaulle largely on his terms and according to his timetable. Instead of developing an American concept of a future and no longer divided Europe, building on but also going beyond the proposed Atlantic Alliance, we have concentrated on the Atlantic Alliance alone. In the absence of the unifying effect of a direct Soviet threat, which the Europeans now discount, and with a growing European preoccupation with the East-West relationships, this narrower American response has left the initiative almost entirely to de Gaulle.

This is not to say that we should forego NATO or forget about the Atlantic Alliance. Far from it. But we can promote both more effectively if we at the same time preempt de Gaulle on the larger question of Europe's future; merely reiterating positions which made very good sense in the fifties no longer constitutes an adequate response to the challenge of the sixties. Moreover, American-German ties require a broader effectively articulated American concept concerning the restoration of Europe in the context of which the German problem will be solved through peaceful reunification.

Consequently, what is needed now is a broader policy of peaceful engagement designed to channel Western contacts with East Europe and the Soviet Union in the direction of more binding and enduring multilateral all-European relationships. This would appear to offer to the Soviet Union an incentive for developing a stabler relationship with the West without at the same time creating opportunities for the further fragmentation of the West. Without at this stage going into details, the purpose of

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such a policy would be to promote a German-East European reconciliation on the basis of the territorial status quo; to minimize the Russian obsession with Germany by striving to develop mutually satisfactory security arrangements; to relate the expansion of economic ties to extensive cultural and social contacts; and to promote multilateral ties between West and East Europe.

In keeping with the above, it may be desirable for the United States to propose a conference of Western heads of government and the Common Market for the purpose of drafting a joint proposal to be addressed to the Communist governments of East Europe and the Soviet Union concerning the development of multilateral economic ties as a first stage to the eventual resolution of the existing political differences, including those concerning Germany. While the specifics of such ties could be worked out by the conference, presumably they would involve either the expansion of some existing multilateral bodies to include the Eastern states, or the development of some new bodies; the undertaking of some common economic and social ventures; and mutual exploration of ways to promote additional ones. Coming in the sixties, the proposal would have the additional advantage over the situation existing in 1947 of the West being economically strong and already possessing a significant infrastructure of unity. The common effort would stimulate further institutional growth and could revive some of the political and emotional momentum on behalf of closer European integration and tighter American-European bonds.

In making such a proposal, it would be useful for the United States to stress the constructive character of past American-European relations and to relate the proposal to the continued need for such close ties. In regard to the present NATO crisis, the virtues of the above approach would appear to be the following: An initiative of this sort would reassert America's constructive and vital interest in Europe's future; it would be likely to stimulate considerable enthusiasm for a common Atlantic effort, thereby preventing the exploitation by de Gaulle of the active English and Scandinavian interest in developing ties with the East or the potential German frustration with the lack of motion on the unification problem; it would seize the initiative from de Gaulle instead of merely defending positions against his attacks and it would place him on the defensive without, however, seeming to attack him; it would hence facilitate continuing efforts to develop an Atlantic community by giving the West a new sense of purpose and direction; it would undo the widespread European feeling that the United States today has only a regional policy focused at present entirely on Asian problems; it would give some Communist states an option other than that of pursuing purely negative and hostile policies toward the West and it would dissipate the allegation that American policy is based purely on anti-Communist premises.

In short, President Johnson has an opportunity similar to that facing President Truman in 1947-48: to chart a new course for American policy in Europe. Moreover, this can be done not by negating the past but by building on the constructive legacy of the Marshall Plan and the impetus originally provided by America to greater European integration.

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LEONARD WOLF

THE DERVISH AND THE HORSE

My horse moves under the sun with a wise patience
Learned of his ancestors who also climbed
Among these dusty hills. We ride past grape
Vines sticking in the soil like twisted wires
Whose shadows every evening writhe and knot
Close to the bony root. The land is dry.
The favorite bird that flies appears to be
The crow, though vultures also haunt the sky.

The dervish whom I visit in his cave
Says I will look like Persia soon. My beard,
Like his, is straggling, and my eyes are dull,
And I no longer blink against the sun.
Soon, he says, I will not even taste
The dust embittered by the patient heat,
Or smell the nervous villages, and soon
The hills he squats in will inform my soul.

He says the land will teach me. In patches where
The earth becomes ashamed of dryness, water
Breaks unwillingly from rocks, or else
Is drawn by tedious *qanats* into
The heat-worn villages and fields. He says
That nightingales will come to join the crows
To tell me all that Persia has to say
Of land and light; of nightingales and crows.

My horse beats at the dust. The dervish
Sleeps in it. I am not innocent
Enough to stand or walk or die in dust.
The dervish says there's also rain. I think
This soil, with its bad habit of survival
And despair is not equipped for speech
Beyond the voices of cicadas' wings
Foretelling famine and bad history.

I tell the dervish this, and he replies
That tongues are wet, and still they turn to dust;
That in his cave at night, his bones are cold,
That sunlight, vultures, nightingales and crows
Are not too dusty for the panting soul.
He says . . . and says . . . and all he says is true
Until I mount and turn my horse away.
The dervish moans. I ride away—estranged.

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FREUD SAW IT COMING

The following conversation was recorded during the cocktail hour at a symposium on "Faith and Agnosticism." The participants were three: an *au courant* Catholic blessed with commitment (*Solemnis*), a satisfied Catholic who has for long lived on the borderline of belief and unbelief (*Ironicus*), and a Freudian psychoanalyst of the old school (*Freudian*).

Solemnis: Good symposium, don't you think? It took a lot of nerve for Father DuKaring to sponsor an encounter between believers and agnostics in this diocese. I hear he got in quite a fight with the bishop.

Freudian: Yes, it has been good. I wasn't very eager to accept the invitation at first. I've always found discussion with Catholics an unpleasant business—they're so hostile. But it hasn't been that way here.

Solemnis: We've come a long way since the Council. I think we realize now—at least the Catholics here—that we have a lot to learn from you people. The main thing, though, is that we first get to know each other as persons.

Ironicus: Sometimes you're boring, Solemnis. That's the tenth time in the last three hours you've said that.

Solemnis: You're a bore sometimes yourself. All you do is make fun of us. But I want to ask Freudian a question. Have we been at all successful in convincing you that our ideas about God and religion are very different from the kind of belief Freud objected to in *The Future of an Illusion*? He called religion "the universal obsessive neurosis" and thought that it could be cured by a good dose of science. If I remember correctly, he said that religious ideas arose "from the necessity of defending oneself against the crushingly superior force of nature" and from "the urge to rectify the shortcomings of civilization which make themselves painfully felt." His own aim, he said, was to reconcile humanity to civilization, and he saw in religion a major obstacle to this goal. Do I have it right?

Freudian: That's the general idea. You know, of course, that Freud wasn't totally hostile to religion. He recognized that it had made many contributions to civilization. But he felt the time had come to move on to a higher stage. My own impression of the symposium is that you Catholics—if you don't mind my saying so—have done much to meet his objections, but that you still miss his main point.

Ironicus: We're good at that sort of thing.

Solemnis: Be quiet, Ironicus. What do you mean Freudian?

Freudian: Well, just this. From what I can make out, you Catholics are now willing to live with considerable religious ambiguity—you don't demand absolute certitude any longer. You're also, so far as I can see, quite reconciled to civilization. From all the references to Harvey Cox's *Secular City* I gather that you don't feel menaced by nature any longer, nor do you look for an otherworldly consolation in the face of human and natural terrors.

Solemnis: I'm glad you see that. There's a very good article in the current *Cross Currents* by Eugene Fontinell. He argues that there can be "faith without certitude." And he makes another point I like. In *The Future of an Illusion* Freud defines "religious ideas" as "teachings and assertions about facts and conditions of external (or internal) reality which tell one something one has not discovered for oneself and which lay claim to one's belief." Fontinell would reject this kind of definition. He speculates that religious concepts and categories may "never *inform* us about anything; they rather serve as limited and relatively inadequate symbols of unknowable and inexpressible mysteries." "Faith," he says, "gives meaning and not knowledge." If any Christians had said that in Freud's day, don't you think he would have been forced to revise his views?

Ironicus: Someone named Callahan also makes much of the glories of uncertainty in his book *Honesty in the Church*. Fontinell and Callahan should put up a tent and hold an uncertainty revival this summer. It's a hot subject; they'd pack 'em in.

Freudian: Wait a minute, Ironicus, let me try to answer Solemnis' last question. Yes, I suspect Freud would have been forced to revise his thinking, but not as much as you might think. True, you've given up the search for certainty and for some types of consolation, but you haven't given up the search for the meaning of life and the establishment of a personal relationship with "God." From what you tell me of Fontinell's article, even he wouldn't want to go that far. That's why I think it fair to say that all of you have missed Freud's main point—that men turn to religion because they can't reconcile themselves to life. It's life you can't accept, and I think Freud would say that all your revisionary theology is just a way of hiding this damaging admission from yourselves; in fact, he saw your new theology coming. And may I say something else? The idea crossed my mind once or twice during this symposium that you Catholics are really using unbelievers like myself as part of an elaborate game of self-justification. You'd like to convince yourselves that you've really become open and honest, afraid of nothing; my presence, then, is something like exhibit No. 1 in your

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"open church" art gallery. But the exhibit is designed as much for your own benefit as mine.

Ironicus: You'd better not say things like that, Freudian. That's just the kind of criticism they dote on. Say it publicly and I guarantee a dozen invitations to "Are-we-really-being-authentic-persons" symposia; and they'd kill you faster, from sheer exhaustion, than the Spanish Inquisition ever could have.

Solemnis: Can't you be serious, Ironicus? Never mind, don't answer. I'm not certain I get your point, Freudian. Surely Freud wouldn't have objected to human beings trying to see some patterns of meaning and purpose in life. If you ever get a chance you might take a look at Michael Novak's book *Belief and Unbelief*. He argues most persuasively that it is of man's nature to ask questions without limit and that this unrestricted drive to know is at the root of religious belief. Moreover, it is precisely the sharing of this drive by the believer and the unbeliever—plus a mutual commitment to self-criticism, honesty and personal integrity—which joins them far more than they realize. If Novak is right about this, unbelievers should have relatively little cause to dismiss the believer's quest as, somehow, inferior to their own.

Freudian: I'll have to think about that a bit. My first reaction, though, is to wonder if this isn't just another defensive step to ward off the unbeliever's objection to religious belief. I'm reminded of the studies some of my colleagues made of concentration-camp prisoners of the Nazis during World War II. They found that a large number of these prisoners responded to the harshness and threats to life in the camps by at first imitating their captors in speech, mannerisms and outlook, and then later, as their mental state deteriorated, by convincing themselves that they too were really Nazis and thus totally misunderstood by their captors. I wonder if there couldn't be an analogy here. The believer, genuinely threatened by the unbeliever (who seems, to paraphrase C. P. Snow, to "have the future in his bones") has at all costs to convince himself that, ultimately, there is little difference between belief and unbelief. It is the believer's way of admitting defeat yet at the same time of saving face and holding on to at least some vestige of his earlier religious obsessions.

Solemnis: That's nothing but speculation. You have no evidence for drawing an analogy like that.

Ironicus: That's the way, Solemnis, hit him where it hurts. Tell him to produce his data, hard scientific data—that's the way they taught us to do back in Theology I. We can have our theological speculations, our cosmic visions, but *they* have to produce evidence for every step they take.

Freudian: Don't be so harsh on your friend, Ironicus. I'm perfectly willing to admit I have no hard data to support my intuition. All I'm trying to point out is that even the believer who thinks himself liberated from the old neurotic shortcomings of traditional religion may still be caught up in them; it's just that his disguises are more elaborate.

Solemnis: I'm beginning to think, Freudian, that in your own benign way you're as dogmatic as the most Curia-minded Catholic. Didn't Freud say in *The Future of an Illusion* that religion must inevitably wither away, so great is the "contradiction" which it offers to "reason and experience"? What is that but the worst sort of dogmatism? Frankly, you don't seem any more open than Freud was. No matter what we do, you turn it against us.

Ironicus: You remember Theology I better than I thought, Solemnis. But you've forgotten one thing: at this point you're supposed to turn the tables and ask Freudian about his childhood. They say that's absolutely devastating; knocks them off their feet every time.

Freudian: I hadn't thought of myself as being dogmatic, Solemnis. It's just that I think Freud was right on the "contradiction." In any case, let me go back to a point I made earlier—that Freud foresaw the attempt of religion to reform itself. There is one passage in *The Future of an Illusion* I like very much: "Even purified religious ideas cannot escape this fate [eventual extinction], so long as they try to preserve anything of the consolation of religion. No doubt if they confine themselves to a belief in a higher spiritual being, whose qualities are indefinable and whose purposes cannot be discerned, they will be proof against the challenge of science; but then they will also lose their hold on human interest." You'll forgive me, won't you, if my ears prick up when I hear you believers talk about a hidden God and about "unknowable and inexpressible mysteries"? I think that this may have been just what Freud had in mind when he wrote that passage. He guessed the believer would try to build a new fortress—but this time out of impenetrable cotton instead of brittle stone.

Solemnis: Of course I disagree with you here. The idea of a hidden God is very old; we're just rediscovering it. So is the uncertainty and darkness of belief. Read the great mystics. This is no new insight, much less one dreamed up to disarm unbelievers. Anyway, it's been good talking with you. I have the feeling that, even though we disagree, we have at least encountered each other as human beings.

Ironicus: Sure.

DANIEL CALLAHAN

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THE SCREEN

No doubt there have been films about young people since the beginning of movies, but I can think of few that stand out with any distinction. The subject continues to interest movie makers throughout the world; and in recent years we have seen such lively and provocative films as the Indian "Apu" trilogy, the Italian "Before the Revolution," and the Canadian "Nobody Waved Goodbye."

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Americans have put in their two cents too, with the honest but rather shallow attempt by Samuel Goldwyn, Jr., to show life on the campus in "The Young Lovers," and with Shirley Clarke's despairing picture of Harlem youth in "The Cool World."

The Hollywood films, however, with their Gidgets and Tammys and Beach Parties give the impression that young Americans never get beyond the bikini and skiing stage. The British have done better with movies like "A Taste of Honey" and "The Loneliness of the Long Distance Runner," and more recently with "The Leather Boys" and "The Girl Getters" and, perhaps best of all for the way it catches the spirit of youth and rebellion in zany comedy, "The Knack."

There is neither comedy nor charm in the latest portrait of today's youth, "A Young World." It was made in France by the Italian director Vittorio De Sica whose "Shoeshine" and "The Bicycle Thief" are among filmdom's greats. But in telling the story of Anne, a first-year medical student in Paris, and Carlo, a young Italian photographer working there, De Sica is rather vague—almost as if he weren't sure what points he wanted to make about this couple. And unfortunately the script by Cesare Zavattini, who has written most of the screenplays for De Sica films, is no great help in defining the characters or the quandary in which they find themselves. Their predicament is old, older certainly than the history of cinema. The boy and girl meet at a students' costume ball, fall in love immediately, have sex right then and there. The girl soon discovers she is pregnant and has cause to be depressed and frightened; but she is delighted later when the boy looks her up and they start going out and their one-shot fling grows into a continuing love affair. The boy isn't happy about the coming baby, but says OK if she has the time.

We get to know little about Anne except that she hoped to return to the small French town from where she came and make a career for herself. About Carlo we learn more—that he thoroughly dislikes his father who was once a man of bright promise and then became at the time of Carlo's birth a grubbing, middle-class money maker; Carlo is fond of his mother but deplores her staying with the husband she no longer loves; Carlo hopes to be a first-rate photographer, specializing in candid shots of faces that reveal the person, instead of the better-paying pictures of nudes and buttocks and breasts. Anne and Carlo are played by two physically attractive young people: Christine Delaroche and Nino Castelnuovo, both of whom are good to look at; but neither succeed in giving much depth to the role or the characters' motives. The fault is not theirs so much as De Sica's and the script's.

"A Young World" catches well the feel of Paris in good black-and-white photography and also catches the turmoil and confusion of today's unsettled times with shots of visiting celebrities, newspaper headlines, soapbox orators and man-in-the-street opinions; but the pic-

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ture reveals the main characters as muddy thinkers. The subject of abortion becomes the key issue, and when Carlo stops seeing Anne for a while (as if in fear of the responsibilities of marriage and fatherhood), Anne finally tells him she will have an abortion. To get the money for the operation, Carlo prostitutes himself to an older woman who pays him well. Anne goes for the operation in a grim, expertly-photographed scene, and then backs out in terror at the last minute. They go to a movie to get off the streets; and during the course of the western, she reveals, "I couldn't go through with it. Forgive me." Carlo is stunned. The movie-within-the-movie ends. Fin. "The End."

Whether this finale is suggesting the end of the relationship between Carlo and Anne, or the end of their confusion about responsibility is not clear. Perhaps De Sica meant it to be ambiguous, as is so much in the movie which seems mainly to be saying the world is a mess and the young couple's elders made it so. But hasn't this been the battle cry of youth through the centuries? The disappointing thing is that a film maker of first rank like De Sica didn't have something new to say about youth today. Perhaps there's nothing new to say except that the form of rebellion displayed by youth is somewhat different. Or is it much different than that shown in the Jazz Age or the Edwardian Period or the *fin de siècle*? Or even when Alexander told his father he was an old dodo? Or perhaps the answer is that De Sica, now in his sixties, is too old to understand and portray youth. Perhaps it takes a youngish Richard Lester, who did so well with the Beatles films and then outdid himself by putting oldsters in their place with the sky-larking "Knack." PHILIP T. HARTUNG

BOOKS

The families of religious myths and symbols

Mephistopheles and the Androgyne

MIRCEA ELIADE

Sheed and Ward, $5

WALTER ARNOLD

Mephistopheles and the Androgyne is a collection of four essays on "families" of religious myths and symbols. There is also a piece on "the vogue for symbolism" generally and its connection to the history of religion. It is true that originally the contents of this small book were aimed at an audience of specialists. But they will have an appeal for anyone interested, from whatever angle, in man's religious past or present. They ought to interest philosophers, poets and artists, as well as "religionists," whatever is intended by that barbarous word. The author tempers his great learning to the shorn reader, most of the time, and brings "the field" to him, so that he may do his own concluding.

The subjects of the essays are fascinating in themselves presented as they are through a generous number of examples. A chapter on "Experiences of the Mystic Light" contains, among others, sections on Yoga, "luminous theophanies," Iranian folklore, the Transfiguration and spontaneous experiences of the light. The other chapters concern "Cosmic and Eschatological Renewal" and "Ropes and Puppets" as well as the title theme, which is really about the search for wholeness and "the reconciliation of opposites." What Professor Eliade is getting at in these studies is not only the similarities in worldwide religious motifs, but especially the possibility of common "existential roots" to these expressions of religious insight. "Every time man becomes aware of his true, existential situation, that is to say of his specific manner of existence in the Cosmos, and accepts his way of existence, he expresses these decisive experiences by images and myths which will afterwards enjoy a privileged position in the spiritual history of humanity."

Most of the author's examples are taken from non-European religious traditions, especially from the more "primitive" and non-literary religions, since they may be closer to the "exemplary human intuitions." One can begin to see the links between, for instance, the symbolism of the Indian Rope Trick, as it expresses a sort of *axis mundi*, a ladder to Heaven and the themes of the Negrito shaman's cord, the Australian medicine man's ropes and indeed Homer's *catena aurea*, the golden string. There are also, apparently, links between the themes of the rope trick and the innumerable myths of cosmic weaving and the web of life in the world's religions. The forms, metaphors and "scenarios" may be different, but there are enough analogies to suggest fundamental unity as to what is sought. Prof. Eliade's selection of less obvious and orthodox examples only strengthens his case.

It is clear that the author has learned a great deal from Jung's analysis of symbols in the personal and "collective" unconscious. He has learned something of the very importance of religious symbols from Jung. The great difference is that Eliade places more emphasis on the historicity and conscious import of his symbols. Even so, the task of the "depth psychologist" and the historian are convergent in that they both seek the ground of the divine-human encounter. Eliade has also, obviously, found masters in Frazer of *The Golden Bough*, Emile Durkheim and Malinowski, among others, cultural anthropologists and ethnographers abounding. Like these men in their sciences, the author as his-

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torian seeks a wider vision and deeper sympathy with all the forms of human religious culture than has been common. He sees his task as a kind of "hermeneutics," an interpretation of religious lore that looks for the most possible meaning.

There are many difficulties in the way of a true dialogue between the modern Western man on one side and the religions of the East and more "primitive" religions past or present on the other. Owing to the growth in the West of an historical consciousness alongside of the appearance of the sciences, philisophical and physical, a critique of mythologies has developed and impelled a "demythologizing of religion" It is true that "myth" has both a positive and a negative meaning with us, but for better or worse we have evolved religions that stress doctrines and a cognitive content that goes "beyond myth." Our major religions are "religions of the book," particularly Judaism and Christianity. Although it is important and from time to time necessary to stress the "left-handed," non-rational aspect of Western religion, the "right-handed" aspect of rational belief is dominant. We have our *odium theologicum*, which the Western pilgrim casts off only at his peril, before the end of the journey.

Also the distance between the "sacred" and the "profane" has widened in the West. The thing that strikes one about the cultures Eliade deals with is that the difference is resolved in favor of the sacred. Nearly everything is sacred, and the secular as such simply does not exist. No doubt we have gone too far in the opposite direction, but we must resolve this dualism on our terms. It may be that the dichotomy itself is unhelpful, but we shall have to come to a new consciousness, different at once from our own present formulas and those of the past.

Finally, religion, as it appears among the people Eliade discusses is primarily cosmological, impersonal and transcendental. In the religious traditions of the West, and to the extent that even "secular" modern man is still consciously religious, religion is more individual, personal-ethical and historical in the sense that it enters and revolutionizes time itself. The differences are not absolute but they are important. It may well be that a renewed cosmical and transcendental sense is just what Western man needs to get out of his "egocentric predicament." But he cannot accept the solutions of others without profoundly changing them in terms of his own cosmology.

There is a growing and healthy interest in the religious traditions of the East and of "primitive" peoples past and present, of which the author's books are product and testimony. As Jung has said, modern man's unconscious is always religious, whether consciously he is or not. And obscurely sources of light are felt below and beyond. Thus the "destined dialogue" between ourselves and "the other," religiously speaking. Whatever knowledge we can get of our own past and our brother man will be counted as sheer gain for our consciousness itself. There are many questions and everything, in a sense, remains to be done, but Professor Eliade points the way to a more satisfactory knowledge of man in his inescapable religious situation.

Politics and the Warren Court

ALEXANDER M. BICKEL

Harper and Row, $6.95

EDWARD N. BEISER

By almost any definition, the 12-year period encompassed by "the Warren Court" has been one of the most exciting in our judicial history. A partial listing of the issues considered by the high court—desegregation, legislative apportionment, prayer in the public schools, the power of congressional committees—serves to illustrate the tremendous impact which the Justices have had on the American political system. *Politics and the Warren Court*, a collection of pieces previously published in law reviews and popular magazines, tends to focus on these issues rather than on the activity of the Court itself.

More than half the book is devoted to the question of Negro civil rights. Bickel presents a careful analysis of the response to the Supreme Court's school desegregation decision in the ten years after *Brown v. Board*, a résumé of the Kennedy Administration's civil rights record, and an extremely detailed examination of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the Voting Rights Act of 1965. In general, both the Supreme Court and the Kennedy Administration come out well; the author feels that both moved forward at about as rapid a pace as the times would allow. The one significant criticism of the Kennedy policy raised by Bickel concerns the appointment of federal judges whose opposition to desegregation could not have been in doubt. He feels that the Administration had much more leeway in this area than it chose to exercise, and that it showed unnecessary deference to Southern Congressional leaders.

President Eisenhower's position on civil rights suffers sharply in comparison with his successor's, and President Johnson's actions are largely ignored. Whether this is a result of the publication of much of this material at an earlier date, or of an underlying bias in favor of JFK, is not clear.

Professor Bickel's discussion of "Civil Rights and Civil Disobedience" is particularly good. On the one hand, he points out that in our federal system the violation of local laws and the appeal to a higher, written law, is not really civil disobedience. But also, the "unthinking emphasis on law and order" cannot replace value judgments. "We cannot, by total reliance on law, escape the duty to judge right and wrong. There is a difference between the segregationist mob—even if it had acted peaceably—on the campus of the University of Mississippi . . . and Dr. King's mob in the streets of Birmingham. It is the moral difference in the ends that the two mobs sought to attain."

Equally penetrating are Bickel's analyses of the apportionment and school-prayer decisions. Without advocating judicial abstention, he strongly criticizes the "one-man, one-vote" approach to reapportionment. "The problem of apportionment seems to call forth in many people the most naïve notions concern-

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ing the nature and functioning of representative democratic government." Bickel feels that the courts are not suited to deal with the substance of legislative apportionments, and that they should restrict themselves to striking down "obsolete apportionments," and requiring legislatures to act affirmatively.

With respect to religion in the public schools, Bickel thinks the decision that the New York Regents Prayer constituted an "establishment of religion" was unfortunate. He suggests persuasively that the emphasis in the later school-prayer cases on freedom of religion, and the coercion to which a non-conformist would be subjected, presents a much more workable standard.

Of particular interest to scholars is an extremely well documented, 50-page appendix discussing the intention of the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment, with respect to segregation. And while Professor Bickel makes no mention of this fact, his historical research may have had a significant impact on the Supreme Court's school desegregation decision. For this appendix is similar to the memorandum which Bickel prepared for Justice Frankfurter in 1953, which Frankfurter circulated to the other members of the Court. Chief Justice Warren's desegregation opinion closely approximates the language of Justice Frankfurter's summary of Bickel's research.

Although individual chapters of *Politics and the Warren Court* are extremely worthwhile, Professor Bickel's attempt to combine previously published articles into a coherent whole did not work out well. Several of the chapters are seriously dated, and one wonders about the wisdom of reprinting them at this time. The fact that the material was originally intended for significantly different audiences made the task all the more difficult. Bickel's extremely detailed analyses of cases and statutes are first rate—and were ideally suited for the law reviews in which they originally appeared. But the general reader is likely to find them tedious, if not irrelevant. On the other hand, his chapters on the political involvement of chief justices, and the role of the law clerks and the law reviews are very brief, and tend to be superficial.

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I would suggest that the primary value of this book is not as a study of the Warren Court (it makes no attempt to step back from the details and treat the broader subject) but rather as a well formulated explication of the role of the courts in our political system. Professor Bickel's judicial philosophy—clearly influenced by Justice Frankfurter—is one of judicial modesty. We must recognize the very real limitations on the judge's ability to force changes on society. Thus the Court had no choice but to pursue a policy of tokenism while awaiting the formulation of a national consensus on desegregation. We must not rely on the courts to remedy all the evils in our society. Thus the real significance of the 1965 Voting Rights Act is that the executive branch—rather than the judiciary—will be called upon to ensure voting rights. And both the public and the judges must realize that choices on questions of public policy cannot be replaced by legal decisions, decisions by what is basically an undemocratic element in a democratic system.

The Serpent's Eye

DONALD P. COSTELLO

Univ. of Notre Dame Press, $6.50

GERALD WEALES

There are still occasional books that attempt to sum up Bernard Shaw in a short space, but the growing Shaw lists consist for the most part of gatherings of uncollected Shaw works, usually under the watchful eye of Dan H. Laurence, or specialized studies of a single aspect of the playwright. Of the latter, one of the most useful is *The Serpent's Eye*, which, as its subtitle indicates, is concerned with "Shaw and the Cinema." The book's virtue, its attention to detail, is not one that will recommend it to the casual reader, but anyone concerned with Shaw or the problem of making films from plays should find much to interest him in Donald P. Costello's slim volume.

The weakest thing in the book is the opening look at Shaw's general remarks on cinema. These are too scattered to add up to a theory, although Costello needs one as a point of departure for his examination of the movies themselves. He finds it by accepting as an aesthetic Shaw's consistency of attitude about the filming of his own plays, his defensiveness about his own words. Having found a place to stand, Costello takes a brief look at *How He Lied to Her Husband* (1931) and *Arms and the Man* (1932), the Cecil Lewis films that were really no more than filmed plays, and then passes on to the heart of the book, the three films—*Pygmalion* (1938), *Major Barbara* (1941) and *Caesar and Cleopatra* (1945)—which Gabriel Pascal made with Shaw's help and/or interference.

In these chapters, which presuppose familiarity with the Shaw plays, Costello describes the scenes that were added to the movies and, to a lesser degree, the way in which material retained in its original verbal form was shot to give it special emphasis. Occasionally he sounds as though the Shaw plays were embalmed on the page, for some of his filmed emphases are simply the result of performance, but for the most part his account of changes and additions is informative. He also takes the trouble to show how the published screenplays of *Major Barbara* and *Pygmalion* differ from both the plays and the films. In one of the appendices, he prints Act V of *Pygmalion*, marked to show how it was altered in both the printed screenplay and the movie. It is such factual material that gives the book its value. In other useful appendices, he gives the credits for all the movies made from Shaw plays, including those which are not a part of his study, those made in foreign languages or after Shaw's death; and prints two bits of Shavian screen writing for productions that never materialized—a scenario for *Arms and the Man* (1941) and two new scenes for *The Devil's Disciple* (late 1930's).

Although *The Serpent's Eye* is more interesting as description than it is as interpretation, it is difficult to quarrel with Costello's conclusions about Shaw's career as a film writer. Costello indicates that the social points were weakened and the romantic possibilities enlarged in the transference of *Pygmalion* to the screen. Even so, he finds it the most successful of the Shaw movies, artistically as well as financially, and assumes that it is so because Shaw had less to do with the direct production than he did with *Major Barbara* and *Caesar and Cleopatra*. With Pascal, as producer of *Pygmalion*, as buffer between Shaw and the filming, the director, Anthony Asquith (Leslie Howard, who played Higgins, is listed as co-director), had a chance to concentrate on turning the Shaw play into a film, using cutting, camera placement, sound, not to undermine Shaw but to present him in a new medium. With Pascal as his own director and Shaw as constant adviser, *Major Barbara* and *Caesar and Cleopatra* stayed closer to the Shaw originals, using the camera's ability to move only to go outside the single set as though the films were plays with cinematic asides. This is particularly true of *Caesar and Cleopatra*, in which, ironically, the spectacular asides finally swallowed the play.

Although Costello is certainly right that *Major Barbara* is not as good a movie as *Pygmalion* is, it has a virtue of its own which makes up for any defects—and I am not thinking of the final scenes shot at the factory which Costello finds the most successful in film terms. It is difficult to imagine assembling a cast that could act *Major Barbara* on stage as effectively as it was performed in the film. The Charles Laughton production (1956) was marred by Laughton's reading of the play as a platform exercise, but even in those terms the play was not as well acted by its stellar cast (Glynis Johns, Burgess Meredith, Eli Wallach, Cornelia Otis Skinner) as was the movie (Wendy Hiller, Rex Harrison, Robert Newton, Marie Lohr) and Laughton's Undershaft, impressive as it was, could not touch that of Robert Morley, who was still an actor in those days, not yet reduced to self-parody.

My chief doubts about *The Serpent's Eye* arise from the image of Shaw that filters through the pages. He comes across as a man who, almost willfully, misunderstands the nature of film, and so chooses to wreck the film versions of his own plays. This is an unfair view of him, one that Costello may not overtly intend, for certainly Shaw's inflexibility must be seen in relation to his age and his position as a major dramatist. He was surely right in the 1920's to resist all attempts to

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convert his plays into movies, for a Shaw film without sound would be as pointless as a Shakespeare film without sound. His resistance to signing away film rights, even after sound came in, makes sense too, for movie companies are not notorious for their fidelity to literary originals, as the posthumous Shaw films indicate (think of the ghastly Preminger *Saint Joan* with its unambiguous miracles).

Shaw's mistake, when he finally let Lewis film two of his plays, was that he had not learned that a filmmaker has to be faithful in his fashion, as Asquith was to be later. He was in his seventies by this time, a little late to learn a new trade, although he was still capable (as his ur-absurdist plays like *Too True to Be Good* indicate) of learning new tricks of an old one. He was in his eighties when Pascal convinced him to turn to the movies again—more busy than creative by this time. The surprising thing is that he was not more rigid than he was, that he was willing to consider new scenes, new possibilities.

In reading *The Serpent's Eye*, I found myself thinking back to the Shaw who hated indiscriminate cutting of Shakespeare, but who advised Ellen Terry how to cut Imogen to make sense of her part in *Cymbeline*. I think of the Shaw who made the film described in C. B. Purdom's biography of Granville Barker, a silent Western in which Shaw, Barker and G. K. Chesterton starred—a film which has, alas, completely disappeared. Costello's book is a careful account of Shaw's encounter with the cinema, but it is the story not of a man strangled by his own theories, but of an old man who came too late to a new medium. In June 1950, Shaw wrote to Pascal, "Look for a young Shaw; . . . you must live in your own generation, not in mine."

REVIEWERS

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CORRESPONDENCE

(Continued from page 301)

there are attractive works that are available. If the super choir is in danger of disbanding and flushing its rich tradition down the drain along with its many laurels, then I might suggest that its director get off his laurels and begin to think creatively on how he can use the choir in a different format of congregation AND choir Liturgy. He can look upon the challenge the Church offers instead of wringing his hands, looking at the music file and bemoaning the good old days when he could perform Palestrina's Masses, Bruckner Motets, and other "meaty" works.

Which brings up another myth. Just how many choirs in this country are (or were) capable of performing such repertory? I don't mean the choir who sang Palestrina once in Lent (chances are that the work wasn't written by Palestrina) and Lassus twice during the Christmas season, and relied heavily on the Caecilian literature for Sunday worship music. I mean those church choirs who have supported a long standing tradition of first-class vocal literature and first-class vocal performance at every Liturgical function. It would not be surprising to find that these same choirs with a bit of planning and original thought on the part of the director would be placed in the front running of the musical aggiornamento. The time of talking about the problems that face all church musicians was spent some time ago. The time for doing and singing is now. The time to create is now. With my apologies to Mr. Thibodeau, I paraphrase:

Free creativity in establishing worship forms deserves much more consideration than we have lately given them. While the creation of the beautiful on earth is not, of itself, a direct throwback to the sublime creative power that comes only from the Deity creating, yet it may continue to spur us on as an appropriate response to the eternal celestial flow of the

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Supreme Artist, the Source of all Created Things. FRED J. MOLECK

"Conscience & Orthodoxy"

Pittsburgh, Pa.

To the Editors: As I see it, Daniel Callahan has put his finger on a coming crisis in the Church ("Conscience and Orthodoxy," April 1.) Perhaps we will only realize the full extent of the crisis when it becomes evident that it affects not only those on the receiving side of the communion rail. There are increasing indications that the same problem exists in the seminaries. And for that matter, in a number of rectories.

As Mr. Callahan indicates, the problem cannot be solved in the authoritarian style of the Post-Tridentine Church. This, I think, is a real blessing. It gives those in authority a real opportunity to become more fully what the gospels call them to be—ministers of word and sacrament. It creates the possibility for bishops and priests to concentrate more on "teaching and sanctifying" and less on "governing." Not that the gospels exclude their "governing," but as I read them, the primary call is to proclaim the word of God, not to promulgate canons.

And at least part of the problem is a lack of credible teaching of truths that have been formulated in dogma. A good instance of this is the Marian dogmas. A large number of seriously committed Catholics that I know find these dogmas problematic at best. The dogma of the Immaculate Conception, for example, should shed significant light on our grasp of the doctrine of election; or the Assumption should deepen our understanding of the Resurrection. But do they? What distinctive light does the person of Mary bring to these realities. Aren't we just as well off by reading Ephesians on election and I Corinthians on the Resurrection. Why drag Mary into it?

Before someone writes me off as a hopeless biblicist, I had better make myself clearer. A growing number of Catholics are turning to scripture as their staple in "spiritual reading." If I view this tendency correctly, it manifests a desire to get to the heart of things, to get to the essentials—or rather, to the essential—Christ. Many are impatient with the peripheral, the non-essential. And the New Testament is never concerned with the peripheral.

Now if teachings like the Marian dogmas are not seen as shedding direct light on Christ, then they are truly peripheral. I think it can safely be said that any teaching which does not foster a deeper knowledge and love of Christ has no relevance to the Christian.

It is not enough to say *that* the Marian dogmas foster the faith of the Christian. It has to be shown that this is so—in preaching, in catechesis, in devotion. If the dogma of the Assumption does not present a new dimension of I Corinthians 15, it is difficult to see why we should not affirm I Corinthians and ignore the Assumption. Doctrinal catch-alls are not enough. The current one seems to be "Type of the Church." Very nice, very "neat" in a theological textbook. But it is still difficult to see the significance of Mary in this scheme, if she is to be treated as a personification of the Church. Who needs the personification? If we say Mary and mean Church, why not simply talk about the Church? The New Testament is clearer on its understanding of the Church than it is in its presentation of Mary as type of the Church. So why all these mental gymnastics to relate Mary and the Church? Doesn't this make her a symbol, and no more?

If the person of Mary is vital to our grasp of the faith, it is high time we showed what this person contributes to that grasp. If we are anathema if we do not believe in her personal pre-natal sanctification and in her bodily assumption, there is a desperate need to see what she has to do with our commitment to Christ.

A frequent complaint is that Catholic teaching is "all too complicated." And this complaint is not made solely by the unlearned and unsophisticated. I would conjecture that it comes from a fundamentally Christian attitude that if the Church speaks in the name of Christ, she should be able to do so without having to resort to complex "explanations," to an esoteric jargon, or to never-ending strings of dogmatic formulations. I wonder if it would be too simplistic to expect that the day might come when Marian dogma, or papal infallibility, or what-have-you might be taught in such a context as to see that these are rather immediate consequences of the affirmation that "Jesus is the Lord." The other frightening alternative is a "blind faith" on the part of many who fail to grasp the connections, and a "knowledge" of those who have the time and talent to become dogmatic theologians. I believe they used to call something like that Gnosticism.

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But this is only one dimension of the problem. The Church at Corinth had the best teaching available, and was all too prone to reject certain vital aspects of the Gospel. How, then, do we deal with those who feel they must reject part of the Church's teaching but will not reject the Church. I think two paths are possible; both will demand far more courage than we have mustered for a long time. One alternative is to narrow the Church to those who are able to commit themselves totally to every jot and tittle of its teaching. This could be done, I think. Not by policing communion rails or by vigilante committees or by witch hunts. We could begin by placing a ban on infant baptism. Then only those who had made a clearcut, mature commitment could call themselves Catholics. Within a generation, nominal or folk-Catholicism would wither away. With the resulting decreased size of the Church, all communities of Catholics would be small enough for the members to know one another personally.

In such a context, those who found themselves unable to accept some aspect of Catholic teaching could be gently and politely refused admission; or once admitted, they could be gently and firmly asked to leave. In such a setting, it would be extremely rare that their views would be unknown. On the more positive side, it would be possible for instruction to be carried out on a more personal basis; the sponsors at baptism, for example, could once again be those who thoroughly instructed the catechumen. Those who later found themselves in a crisis of faith could be more easily reached and assisted by fellow Catholics. Policing our present communion rails would be, if not impossible, at least odious. It would not be so impossible—nor so odious, if the Sunday Eucharist were, say, a gathering of thirty or forty friends. Such a solution is admittedly radical. It could be beneficial; the Church as a powerful and wealthy institution would cease to exist. But it might take on all the characteristics of a fanatical sect.

Callahan's solution seems to lie on another path; be as all-embracing as possible, letting the healthy members assist those who are not so healthy. My difficulty with an all-inclusive Church is this —does not the Church as a clearly distinguishable reality cease to exist? On what grounds do we admit to communion the Catholic who rejects some aspect of Catholic teaching and deny communion to the Protestant whose views are practically the same? I fail to see any essential difference between the Catholic who, say, rejects certain elements of Catholic teaching but feels that he can pray the Nicene Creed in all good conscience, and the Protestant who can do likewise. It would seem that if we make a difference between the two, we are conceiving the Church as a purely juridical reality; we are forced to maintain that membership in the Church stands, not on baptism, but on whether that baptism is registered in St. Aloysius parish or at the First Methodist Church. The logic of a more inclusive Church would seem to demand intercommunion.

Neither solution is entirely satisfactory, but it would seem that we have to set ourselves quite clearly on one path or another. Again, in a new context, does the Eucharist create unity or is it the fruit of unity? RALPH A. KEIFER

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

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